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ABSTRACT While the IFP/ANC race for first place in KwaZulu-Natal was the
closest of any in the country, the 1999 election was both freer and fairer than
ever before, and the result was readily accepted by all parties. In short, the 1999
election further consolidated both the institutions and culture of liberal democ-
racy. Importantly, this consolidation was predicated in an understanding
reached between the IFP and ANC that, whatever the outcome of the election,
they would co-operate in government at both national level and in KwaZulu-
Natal. In so doing, the stakes of the election were lowered, making a free and
fair election not just more affordable but also desirable so as to legitimate future
governance. This deal is further confirmation of the trend in KwaZulu-Natal
politics away from the ethnically couched confrontational styles of the transition
years towards a more ideologically inclusive and co-operative politics. This
trend, along with the basic patterns of party affiliation, suggest that KwaZulu-
Natal is no more unique politically than any other province in South Africa.
As a competition amongst political parties for popular support, the 1999 election
in KwaZulu-Natal was the closest in the country. The IFP won 41.9 per cent of
the provincial ballot to the ANC's 39.38 per cent, in the process confounding the
pollsters,1 while the DP secured 8.16 per cent, the NNP 3.28 per cent and the MF
2.93 per cent. Critically, unlike in 1994, the results were not shrouded in
controversy due to massive intimidation and fraud. Indeed, as an exercise in free
and fair electioneering, the election exceeded expectations, reflecting the com-
mitment of political parties to a democratic process. Importantly, this commit-
ment was rooted in a political deal between the ANC and IFP which, represented
in the 'peace process', amounted to an agreement that, regardless of the election
results, the two parties would govern jointly at national level and in KwaZulu-
Natal. This lowered the stakes of the election, indeed it encouraged a free and
fair election so as to legitimate future governance. Further evidence of the
rapprochement cultivated by the ANC since 1994, this deal confirms that the
feature which has long distinguished KwaZulu-Natal politics, rivalry between
the ANC and IFP, is evolving in a more constructive direction.2
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Political context
On Friday 14 May 1999 at the Durban City Hall the ANC, led by party
deputy-president Jacob Zuma, and the IFP, led by KwaZulu-Natal Premier
Lionel Mtshali, signed a code of conduct which embraced (1) free political
activity, (2) building a culture of peace and tolerance, (3) a call for impartial and
effective policing, and (4) the restraint of party members and supporters from
infringing the code.3 Addressing a crowd of several thousand afterwards, Zuma
and Mtshali said the code was intended to bring to an end the violence that had
claimed 14,000 lives in 15 years and facilitate a free and fair election. While the
code renewed the ANC/TFP peace process which had begun in the run-up to the
1996 local government elections, it contained nothing not already covered by the
Electoral Code of Conduct which political parties, including the ANC and IFP,
had publicly signed on 5 May 1999.4 The reason for this was that the ANC/IFP
code represented more than simply a 'peace deal'. It reflected, and was made
possible by, a political understanding between the ANC and IFP that future
governance at both national level and in KwaZulu-Natal would be shared
between the two parties.
This particular deal must be seen in the context of the ANC's strategy since
1994 of co-operation with the IFP. While the advent of a liberal-democratic
constitutional order has facilitated the normalisation of relations between the two
parties,5 it does not explain their evident rapprochement, represented in the close
relationship between Thabo Mbeki and Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Fundamentally,
this has materialised because it is in the interests of both parties. First, the ANC
has learnt from the transition that the costs of excluding the IFP are high,6 while
the benefits of including it in government are peace and development.7 Second,
driven by heavyweights Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, the ANC has pursued
conciliatory tactics with the IFP in the belief that co-operation will emasculate
it. This will happen by winning IFP politicians over to the hegemonic perspec-
tive of the ANC government, and by blurring the distinction between the ANC
and IFP in the eyes of supporters. While the IFP is not unaware of the latter
motivation, indeed it is one of the reasons why the party periodically 'rebels'
against ANC overtures, co-operation remains attractive as it offers the IFP
greater access to power than it would otherwise enjoy. Along with power go the
resources crucial for the party's survival and elevated status which is important
for key leaders like Buthelezi.
When the peace process was resumed in late March it was presented in the
media as national leadership redressing a deterioration in party relations at
provincial level.8 However, the reality had more to do with the difference
between common long-term interests of the ANC and IFP in co-operation, and
divergent short-term interests around the election. For the ANC, the belief that
it could win KwaZulu-Natal saw it embrace a more aggressive tone which,
somewhat unfairly, was associated with new provincial leader S'bu Ndebele.
Indeed, with the election now settled, Ndebele has adopted an accommodatory
manner consistent with the ANC nationally. Similar dynamics were evident in
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the IFP. In early 1999, KwaZulu-Natal premier Ben Ngubane, a well-respected,
competent and moderate IFP leader, was replaced by Lionel Mtshali, an
incompetent and hard-line party satrap. Apparently related to the poor perform-
ance of the Ngubane's government in respect of education,9 the real motivation
was Buthelezi's concern to have in place a man who would unquestioningly
pursue short-term party interests.10 Central here was a more aggressive stance in
respect of the ANC, symbolised in Mtshali's announcement to move his office
to Ulundi, so as to rekindle anti-ANC sentiment amongst IFP supporters for the
election. Given the ANC's own more hard-line posturing, relations deteriorated
and reports of violence rose.11 Concerned at the consequences for a free and fair
election and thus the legitimacy of future governance, Mbeki and Buthelezi
stepped in, and the 'peace process' was resumed.
The resumption of talks did not mean that it was only now that the question
of future governance was broached. For example, the Mail & Guardian posited
that the deployment of Mtshali as Premier in KwaZulu-Natal was partly to move
Ben Ngubane back to national level so that he could play a role in a post-election
cabinet.12 Certainly speculation as to whether Mbeki had offered Buthelezi the
deputy-presidency was already rife, and it seems likely that they already enjoyed
an understanding that Buthelezi would hold a senior position in Mbeki's cabinet.
Consequently, it is more accurate to read the resumption of the peace process as
about the ANC and IFP setting the boundaries within which differing short-term
interests over the election could be played out so that the long-term project,
co-operative governance, would not be jeopardised.13 This tension was compli-
cated by, but not caused by, differences between national and provincial levels
of the political parties. In the event, the positive effects of the peace process
were felt throughout all aspects of the 1999 election in KwaZulu-Natal.
Administration
The administration of the election was handled by the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). Unlike in 1994 when the IEC was seen as ANC-aligned, in
1999 the IEC enjoyed the respect of all parties, confirming the legitimacy of
these new political institutions. As Reverend Chris Mzoneli, IEC Provincial
Election Officer pointed out, the commitment of parties to a free and fair election
had the biggest impact on the positive nature of the event.14 While the ANC/IFP
peace pact did not remove local tensions, it prevented them from exploding into
violence, and demonstrated the capacity of political parties to restrain party
members and supporters when the political will is present. Hence it was no
surprise that ECCO received only 60 complaints of infringements of the electoral
code of conduct.15 Indeed, all observers concurred that the 1999 election was a
big improvement on the 1996 local government elections, never mind the 1994
election.
In this much improved context the IEC delivered the election in a reasonably
efficient, even-handed and also transparent way. This is not to say the election
was without administrative problems. There were some minor problems with
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delimitation and counting, but the most important ones concerned the regis-
tration process, the voters' roll and the administration of some polling stations
on election day. Faced with a potential 4,691,093 voters, the most of any
province, the IEC faced a difficult challenge in ensuring good voter registration.
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the IEC spent very little on voter
education. Indeed, it was common cause that voter education was a major weak
point in election preparations.16 In rural areas of the province voter registration
simply did not happen until traditional leaders were involved, although their role
was decoupled from the rivalry between political parties unlike in 1994.17 Hence,
following the final registration drive of March 1999, 3,463,753 or 63.4 per cent
(64.1 per cent urban, 63.1 per cent rural) of potential voters had registered, the
lowest turnout of any province.18
In respect of the voters' roll, many who had registered simply did not appear,
or appeared at the wrong voting stations. While the IEC had a mechanism to deal
with this, almost all political parties expressed the fear that the IEC would be
unable to handle the number of people who wanted to vote but who were not on
the lists, and that this might lead to violence.19 In the event, the IEC decided to
allow people to vote at the polling station at which they had registered, but in
many places this degenerated into allowing anyone to vote who could prove they
had registered. While the figures involved are still unknown, it seems they are
small.20 Lastly, the functioning of voting stations on election day ran smoothly
with the exception of a minority where presiding officers mismanaged the
process. Problems emerged because of the last minute change of regulations
concerning the voters' role, because the IEC drew from professions unused to
dealing with regulations,21 and also because of basic incompetence and/or lack
of training.22 On the whole though, the administration of the election was far
closer to the democratic ideal, as was campaigning in 1999.
Campaigning
The distinctive features of campaigning in KwaZulu-Natal were rooted in the
understanding reached between the ANC and IFP, and the peace pact that flowed
from that. For one thing, electioneering was far more peaceful than anticipated.
In the three months preceding 2 June less than 50 people died in politically
related conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. This was dramatically better than in 1994
when 1,000 were killed over a similar period, and much improved on the
monthly average of 38 in 1996.23 Further, campaigning happened in many 'no-go
areas' for the first time, although the extent of this was limited and the nature
of it was diplomatic. For example, when the ANC decided to campaign seriously
in rural areas it ensured that it did so with the consent of the traditional leaders
as far as possible.24 Similar accounts of campaigning in the townships were
given by the NNP and the IFP.25 Lastly, as will be shown, the nature of the
campaigns of the ANC and IFP were influenced by the political understanding
between the two parties.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the IFP's campaign was not just that it
148
1999 ELECTION IN KWAZULU-NATAL
had national and provincial components, but that the national component was so
well developed. Despite the fact that the IFP won just 14 per cent of its support
outside of KwaZulu-Natal in 1994,26 Buthelezi embarked on a national tour
which saw him visit every province at least twice. The national campaign
emphasised Buthelezi's status as a national leader, and the IFP's status as a
national party which would be better placed to fight the ANC from inside, rather
than outside, government.27 Given the dependence on KwaZulu-Natal for votes
one would have expected the bulk of IFP resources and effort to go into the
provincial campaign, and especially the rural areas, not least as the ANC was
campaigning in many of these for the first time. However, while the IFP ran a
provincial campaign of unprecedented organisational sophistication, activity in
rural areas was disappointing, not least due to a lack of funds. Consequently the
IFP was unable to host the number and scale of events it would have liked to,
and resorted to initiatives in rural areas like public announcements from vehicles,
the effectiveness of which was uncertain.28
In contrast, the ANC had a much larger budget and could focus all of its
energies on winning KwaZulu-Natal. The seriousness with which the ANC
regarded the contest was reflected in the large number of visits by Thabo Mbeki
and the way he was used at rallies in former 'no-go areas' like Ndwedwe,
Richmond and Ulundi.29 Embracing what campaign co-ordinator Senzo Mchunu
described as a 'consolidate and advance' strategy, the ANC looked to secure its
support in urban areas, before moving on to contest other constituencies, notably
rural voters. Indeed, the party ploughed unprecedented energy and resources into
campaigning in rural areas, particularly those in the south of the province.30
Reinforced by opinion polls which consistently put it ahead in the race, the
ANC's campaign was remarkably upbeat and free in its criticisms of the IFP.
Hence both the IFP and ANC concentrated on the areas in which they were weak
vis-a-vis the other, the IFP nationally and the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, safe in
the knowledge that while the outcome of the election would not threaten
co-operation in governance, it would impact on the precise nature of that
governance.
The DP followed closely the strategy and tactics of the national campaign,
pouring most of its resources into historically Indian and conservative white
areas, rather than its traditional strongholds. It was the only party to systemati-
cally use telephone canvassing, in the belief that this was worth at least 20 per
cent of its total vote.31 The only way the DP's campaign differed from its
national strategy was in the manner in which it characterised its relationship with
the provincial ANC. Sharing an antipathy with the ANC towards the 'Ulundi
mafia',32 the KwaZulu-Natal DP balanced the virulent anti-ANC message of
national with an anti-IFP slant too. The remaining parties in KwaZulu-Natal
conducted campaigns of far lesser significance. Somewhat mysteriously, given
the real threat posed by the DP to its Indian and conservative white support, the
NNP emphasised the importance of winning black votes.33 In effect, it looked to
advance before it had consolidated and paid the price. Furthermore its campaign
lacked a clear focus in message and tactics, a problem exacerbated by the
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decentralised manner in which it was run.34 The MF, while more clearly focused
in 'looking after the Indians' emphasised the role of Rajbansi as a politician who
would service his constituency 'All the Way' as the campaign slogan had it. The
latter also reflected an attempt by the MF to overcome the tendency of MF voters
to vote tactically, and thus turn provincial votes into national votes too.35 Finally,
the UDM ran a very low-key campaign due to both a lack of funds and
organisational weakness,36 while the ACDP tended to work on a low key,
constituency basis.
The results
That the 1999 election in KwaZulu-Natal bore the imprint of the ANC/IFP
understanding and the peace pact which flowed from it, is reflected both in the
results themselves and in the way the parties received them. To begin with, the
good percentage poll of 84.9 per cent (see Table 1) confirms the picture of a well
run and comparatively free and fair election. This noted, some 700,966 (19.13
per cent) fewer votes were cast in 1999 than in 1994, a fact which affirms both
party allegations of the lack of voter education and the exceptional nature of the
1994 election. Also notable is that while registration was slightly higher in urban
areas than rural (64.1 per cent to 63.1 per cent), turnout was slightly better in
rural areas than urban (86.27 per cent to 83.76 per cent), therefore having
virtually no impact on the outcome.
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Contrary to the opinion polls, the IFP remained the largest party in KwaZulu-
Natal although with a significant reduction from its 50.3 per cent of 1994. As
importantly, the comparatively free and fair nature of the election meant that this
outcome was not called into question. The IFP's performance pushed it into third
place nationally, with some 87 per cent of the party's support coming from
KwaZulu-Natal, slightly more than in 1994. In this sense then, the IFP's national
campaign was a failure. If the IFP is largely a provincial party, then it remains
largely a party of rural black people. Some 65.98 per cent of rural voters
supported it, constituting 76.45 per cent of its total support in KwaZulu-Natal.
Interestingly, this is less than in the 1996 local government elections where the
IFP secured 77.35 per cent of the rural vote, constituting 83 per cent of its total
vote.37 Mostly this reflects that the IFP has lost rural votes to the ANC
explaining its overall decline since 1994, but it also reflects that the IFP did
slightly better in urban areas receiving 19.17 per cent of the urban vote
compared to 14.6 per cent in 1996. As argued below, this extra 5 per cent were
mostly white voters voting tactically for the IFP provincially and NNP, possibly
the DP, nationally, a trend very similar to 1994.38
The IFP's losses were the ANC's gains as the two jostled for the status of
KwaZulu-Natal's biggest party. In the end the ANC lost the race by 2.52 per
cent, but scored a moral victory by making significant inroads into the IFP's
rural support. Indeed the ANC won 27.54 per cent of the rural vote compared
to just 17 per cent in 1996, and the rural component of the total ANC vote rose
from 24.66 per cent in 1996 to 33.4 per cent in 1999. ANC gains were most
remarkable in the south of the province where it secured some 43.7 per cent of
the vote, less than 5 per cent adrift of the IFP. For instance in the Ilembe
Regional Council, the rural areas surrounding Durban, the IFP pipped the ANC
by some 390 votes out of a possible 177,664; and in the Ugu Regional Council,
the rural areas on the south coast, the ANC improved from a showing of 17.1
per cent in 1996 to 44.25 per cent in 1999. To some extent this swing can be
attributed to the fact that it was in these areas that the ANC campaigned most
vigorously, but this begs the question of why it was easier to campaign here. The
most likely answers include the distance from the heartland of the IFP both
geographically and historically. Notably though, the ANC also made gains in the
north of the province of between 5 and 10 per cent for each regional council
which confirms that there is no inherent reason why rural Zulu people will not
support the ANC.
In addition to the swing in the rural vote, the other significant trend of the
1999 election in KwaZulu-Natal was the reorganisation of the 'opposition' vote.
While the ANC and IFP may have struggled vigorously against each other, they
kept the same percentage of the overall vote as in 1994 (81.28 per cent), while
the other parties shared the remainder. The only difference this time was the
collapse of the NNP and the rise of the DP, exactly the same trend as elsewhere
in South Africa. Where the NNP secured 11.2 per cent in 1994 and 12.69 per
cent in 1996, it dipped dramatically to 3.28 per cent in 1999; conversely the DP
rose from 2.2 per cent in 1994, to 3.3 per cent in 1996, to 8.16 per cent. The
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other beneficiary of the decline of the NNP was the MF which rose slightly from
its 1.3 per cent in 1994 to 2.93 per cent in 1999. An examination of the returns
by polling district revealed that many areas which used to support the NNP,
historically poorer white and historically Indian areas, now endorsed the DP
before any other party.39
This shift probably had much to do with perceptions about the effectiveness
of opposition to government, hence the tactical voting evident between the
national and the provincial ballots. For instance, the IFP and the MF both did
better provincially than nationally. The IFP gained 44,598 votes or 3.5 per cent
in its total provincial support, and the MF 43,745 or 50.4 per cent in its total
support. Conversely, the DP gained 46,729 or 16.26 per cent on the national
ballot, and the NNP gained 20,014 or 17.1 per cent. An examination of the
returns for the historically Indian areas of Chatsworth and Phoenix suggests that
half of all MF voters in the province split their vote and supported the DP and
NNP on the national ballot, but especially the DP. Similarly, the returns for
historically white areas suggest some modest vote-splitting in favour of the NNP
nationally and IFP provincially.
Conclusion
The 1999 election in KwaZulu-Natal was a great advance in the consolidation
of democracy, primarily because the dominant political parties in the province
wanted it to be. Not only was the legitimacy of democratic institutions affirmed,
but important gains were made in respect of extending and deepening values like
tolerance and freedom of speech. That is not to say significant problems do not
linger on, they do. Nevertheless, the election demonstrated that where there is a
political will, there is a peaceful way. This movement towards democracy is also
significant in that it reinforces the return of KwaZulu-Natal politics back into the
South African mainstream. This applies in respect of degrees of peace and
tolerance, but also in respect of the fundamental shape of political allegiances.
If one considers the IFP and ANC together, which given their recent rapproche-
ment there is some basis for, then KwaZulu-Natal is no different from the rest
of South Africa in its basic patterns of political allegiance. In this province and
nationally we have parties in government which represent those who were
oppressed under apartheid, and in opposition we have parties representing those
who enjoyed some comparative benefit. The legacy of the apartheid political
economy (as opposed to simply apartheid racial categories) lingers on.
This granted, the election demonstrated that where KwaZulu-Natal remains
unique is in the ongoing rivalry between the IFP and ANC. The results confirm
that the divide between the ANC and IFP in KwaZulu-Natal is not ethnic, and
while in 1994 and 1996 it was a divide between urban blacks who supported the
ANC and rural Zulus who supported the IFP,40 this is beginning to break down.
Not only does this trend reinforce the argument that interest, as much as identity,
determines which party voters endorse,41 but it affirms the importance of party
agency. Indeed, it is the rivalry between the IFP and ANC which is the source
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of all that is substantially different about KwaZulu-Natal politics.42 This was
illustrated graphically by the fact that the election was freer and fairer because
the ANC and IFP had a political understanding that whatever the outcome, they
would co-operate in government both nationally and in KwaZulu-Natal. Lastly,
though, the 1999 election confirms that since 1994 the ANC/IFP rivalry has
moved away from the ethnically couched confrontational styles of the transition
years towards a more ideologically inclusive and co-operative politics.43 Thus
despite the post-election wrangling over the deputy-presidency of South Africa
and the premiership of KwaZulu-Natal, the commitment of the ANC and IFP to
co-operation in national government and a coalition in KwaZulu-Natal were
never in doubt.
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